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PRICE INCLUDES TAX:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM
TAX-EXCLUSIVE PRICING
HAYES HOLDERNESS*
INTRODUCTION
Millions of Americans are suffering economic harm every day,
and not just as a result of the current economic crisis. Savings are
being lost, people are sacrificing leisure time to make ends meet,
debt is rising, and consumers are finding that they are unable to
afford the goods they prefer. The cause of this harm is a seemingly
benign practice, a practice so widespread that many people proba-
bly have not thought twice about it. That practice is tax-exclusive
pricing, whereby prices are presented without tax included.
The European Community requires that prices on consumer
goods include tax.' Indeed, other countries have embraced this
idea and also require tax-inclusive pricing.2 This practice is thought
to protect consumers from becoming misled as to the total cost of
the products they purchase. Tax-exclusive pricing presents a prob-
lem because it lowers the salience of taxes, causing them to become
hidden from consumers. Recent studies and economic analyses of
behavior show that consumers will systematically undervalue the
cost of hidden taxes and, as a result, will over-consume.3 Overcon-
sumption can lead to decreased savings, overworked individuals,
and increased amounts of debts or cuts in consumption of other
desired products. To prevent these effects, consumers must be
given the total cost of a product before they decide to buy it, not
after.
* J.D. 2011, New York University School of Law; B.A. Political Science 2006,
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Articles Editor for the New York
University Annual Survey of American Law in 2010-11. I would like to thank
Professor Lily Batchelder and my colleagues in her Tax and Social Policy Seminar
for their insight and support.
1. Council Directive 98/6, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 80) 27 (EC).
2. See Value Added Tax Law, 5736-1975, 30 LSI 46 (1975-76) (Isr.); ALAN A.
TAIT, VALUE ADDED TAx: INTERNATIONAL PRAcrICE AND PROBLEMs 357 (1988) (pro-
viding that New Zealand requires tax-inclusive pricing).
3. See generally Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation:
Theory and Evidence, 99 Am. ECON. REv. 1145 (2009) (studying hidden taxes in gro-
cery stores and in alcoholic beverage sales); Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience
and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009) (studying hidden charges at toll plazas).
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The harms resulting from the undervaluation of hidden taxes
have received scholarly attention, but this Note approaches them
from a different angle, analyzing them through the lens of United
States consumer protection law. This analysis concludes that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) should use its
rulemaking authority to mandate tax-inclusive pricing for con-
sumer goods. For the purposes of this Note, "consumer goods" are
understood to be those products and services purchased by "con-
sumers"; that is, unsophisticated end users.4 Therefore, business
purchases and distributor purchases are excluded from this analysis
for the most part. A mandate requiring tax-inclusive pricing would
ensure that the costs of taxes are not hidden from consumers by
presenting them with the information they need to make accurate
purchasing decisions. There are three general forms this mandate
could take: it could require that tax and price both be stated sepa-
rately but not added together, that tax and price both be stated
separately and added together, or that fully tax-inclusive prices with
no breakdown be presented. As will be developed, the FTC should
require that tax and price both be stated separately and added to-
gether. There are two ways to accomplish this scheme: having both
the tax and the tax-inclusive price presented on the price tag,5 or
having only the tax-inclusive price on the price tag along with a
breakdown of tax and price on the receipt. Either way should suf-
fice to prevent consumer harm.
In a country that prides itself on demand-driven markets, con-
sumers should be given as much information relevant to their
purchasing decisions as is reasonably necessary and possible.6 What
information is reasonably necessary is debatable, but cost is a neces-
sary piece of information for any consumer-driven market. Con-
sumers must see the total cost of a product on the price tag, or they
will continue to make imperfect decisions. Some taxes are already
4. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 359 (9th ed. 2009) (defining consumer prod-
uct as "[a] n item of personal property that is distributed in commerce and is nor-
mally used for personal, family, or household purposes"); accord FTC Cooling-Off
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(b) (2010). See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra, at 358 (de-
fining consumer as "[a] person who buys goods or services for personal, family, or
household use, with no intention of resale; a natural person who uses products for
personal rather than business purposes").
5. "Price tag" should be taken to include both the posted price in-store and
online (as the case may be) and advertised prices.
6. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theo7y of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 722-23 (1997) (dis-
cussing how failures "inside the head" of consumers, such as making decisions on
incomplete information, can cause markets to operate inefficiently).
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included in price in the United States, most notably excise taxes.
Excise taxes are taxes imposed on specific goods-unlike sales
taxes, which are imposed on purchases generally.7 However, there
are still many taxes that are not, such as state sales taxes, and con-
sumers are being harmed by the exclusion of those taxes. Almost
every consumer, acting rationally or irrationally, has probably ig-
nored taxes in his or her life, and has over-consumed as a result.
While the harm from each individual purchase is relatively small,
the aggregate harm to consumers is monumental. Mandating that
consumers be presented with a tax-inclusive price will ensure that
these harms are avoided.
This Note is divided into five parts. Part I describes the current
tax disclosure scheme for consumer goods and also how consumers
make their purchasing decisions. This Part provides background in-
formation necessary to frame the remaining discussions, describing
the current tax disclosure regime and illustrating the consumer
purchase decisionmaking process that leads to the undervaluation
of undisclosed taxes. Because current law does not require the dis-
closure of all taxes on the price tag and because consumers make
their purchasing decisions based on price tags and not total cost,
the current tax disclosure regime can be expected to negatively af-
fect consumer purchasing decisions.
Part II considers the effects of tax salience on consumers, con-
cluding that hidden taxes should be expected and that consumers
undervalue those taxes. Both rational actor theory and behavioral
economics analyses are used to reach this conclusion. Rational ac-
tor theory shows that consumers should be expected to ignore taxes
on very low priced items, calculate taxes on highly priced items, and
approximate taxes on the remainder of their purchases. Behavioral
economics enhances this showing by explaining why individuals,
suffering from multiple cognitive biases, will either ignore or ap-
proximate the taxes on most items; and when they approximate,
they will systematically undervalue the cost of those taxes.
Part III discusses the welfare implications of consumers' under-
valuation of taxes. This Part finds that hidden taxes likely harm so-
cial welfare by fostering over-taxation and by operating in a
regressive manner. Individuals suffer from the income effects of
their undervaluations, causing them to decrease their savings, work
more than they would prefer, take on increased amounts of debt,
or cut consumption of other desired products. Given that hidden
7. Compare BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 646 (defining excise
tax), with id. at 1597 (defining sales tax).
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taxes likely cause social harm, there do not appear to be any bene-
fits to individuals that offset the harms of overconsumption.
Part IV considers the policy implications of these harms. This
Part establishes that the FTC is the best actor to solve the problem
of these harms, and that it has the authority to act. By analyzing the
harms through the FTC's unfair trade practice jurisprudence, it is
shown that tax-exclusive pricing is an unfair trade practice. The
strengths and weaknesses of the different tax disclosure schemes
are then considered, and it is shown why requiring that both the
tax-inclusive price and the tax on an item be presented is the best
way to prevent consumer harms. Part V concludes.
I.
BACKGROUND
This Part will briefly discuss the current tax disclosure scheme
and the process of consumer decisionmaking to help frame the rest
of the Note. Recall that consumer goods are those products and
services purchased by unsophisticated end users, and that consum-
ers are understood to be those end users.
A. The Current Tax Disclosure Scheme
Currently, state and local governments are the main entities
imposing taxes on consumer goods. To date, the federal govern-
ment does not levy taxes on consumer goods as a whole, but does
impose taxes on some discrete categories of goods." However, some
academics and policy makers have advocated for a value added tax
that would tax general consumption.9 If such a tax were imposed,
then the issues discussed in this Note would become relevant to
such a tax.
Taxation schemes differ from state to state. There are a pleth-
ora of taxes that could be levied on consumer goods.10 For simplic-
ity's sake, this Note will focus on state sales taxes, which are
probably the most prominent type of taxes that can become hid-
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5701 (federal tax on tobacco products). Federal taxes on
consumer goods are found in Subtitles D and E of the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. §§ 4000-5891.
9. See generally Paul R. McDaniel, A Value Added Tax for the United States? Some
Preliminary Reflections, 6J. CoRP. L. 15 (1981) (discussing issues surrounding adop-
tion of value added tax in United States).
10. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §139.200 (West 2010) (levying general sales
tax, hotel tax, tax on sewer services, tax on prepaid calling services, tax on commu-
nications services, and tax on distribution services for natural gas).
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den. Forty-five of the fifty states impose a sales tax, which is not
typically included in the good's posted price. 1
While this Note will only make reference to sales taxes, other
taxes on consumer goods should not be ignored when considering
the welfare and policy implications of the current taxation scheme.
For now it suffices to say that consumer goods are taxed differently
by each state, and not all of these taxes are included in posted
prices.
While posted prices across the United States do not typically
include all taxes, the full price of products is revealed at the register
before the consumer ultimately pays. Therefore, taxes are techni-
cally disclosed to consumers before they make their purchase. How-
ever, this form of disclosure has little impact on consumers, as a
brief exploration of the process of consumer purchasing decisions
will show.
B. Consumer Purchasing Decisions
The previous Section gave a brief background of the current
state of tax disclosure laws, showing that not all taxes on consumer
goods are included in price. This Section shows that consumers
make their purchasing decisions before they reach the register, and
they are very reluctant to change those decisions, even when
presented with full price information at the register. As such, when
coupled with the fact that not all taxes are included in price, it can
be expected that undisclosed taxes will affect consumer perceptions
of the cost of a product. While direct research on this particular
behavior is somewhat sparse, research into consumer choice sup-
ports the conclusion that purchasing decisions are made before the
register, and rational and behavioral analyses explain why consum-
ers are reluctant to change their minds.12
Consumers take a number of different approaches to their
purchasing decisions.' 3 These approaches may be complex and
11. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon are the five
states without any general sales taxes. See 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HEL-
LERSTEIN &JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION 1 12.02 (3d ed. 2010). However, some
municipalities in Alaska do charge a local sales tax. Id.
12. Under rational actor theory, individuals weigh the costs of choices and
select the least costly alternative. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. Behav-
ioral analyses look to actual human behavior to formulate predictions of future
human behavior. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476-77 (1998).
13. See Michele D. Bunn, Taxonomy of BuyingDecision Approaches, 57J. MARKET-
ING 38, 38, 46-50 (1993) (offering detailed analysis of buyer decision approaches
for different types of purchases).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2011] 787
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 66:783
multi-stepped, but what is important for this Note is that consumers
tend to make their decision to purchase before they reach the regis-
ter. 14 Price is an important dimension in consumer purchasing de-
cisions, and posted prices carry heavy weight because consumers
make their purchasing decisions based on the information that is
readily accessible to them at the time they make their decision. This
occurs when they select the item, not when they pay for it. Informa-
tion that is given later, such as the fully tax-inclusive price, has a
significantly reduced impact on the consumer.' 5 This reduced im-
pact creates the potential for valuation mistakes by consumers.
Further, consumers should not be expected to change their
decisions once they are presented with full price information at the
register. Rational actor theory can explain this behavior if the cost
of turning back and finding different products outweighs the addi-
tional disclosed cost. It seems plausible that it would be less costly to
simply buy the product, since in many cases the additional cost
from the tax will be relatively small, and the hassle of finding new
products can be time-consuming. Even if rational actor theory
would imply turning back, the endowment effect is a bias in individ-
uals that causes them to attach above market value to items they
already possess.1 6 If a consumer has already decided to purchase a
product, then he will value it higher than its economic value and
thus be reluctant to swap it out for another item upon disclosure of
the true price.
Given this model of consumer decisionmaking, the practice of
tax-exclusive pricing can be expected to affect consumer percep-
14. Richard M. Bird, Policy Forum: Visibility and Accountability-Is Tax-Inclusive
Pricing a Good Thing?, 58 CAN. TAX J. 63, 68-69 (2010) ("[Mlost consumer
purchase decisions are made in the aisles, not at the cash register."); see Chetty et
al., supra note 3, at 1149 (noting that in their model explaining the effects of tax
salience, " [the price that consumers see when deciding what to purchase is [the
posted price]; the sales tax is not included in the posted price").
15. See Stephanie Stern, Temporal Dynamics ofDisclosure: The Example of Residen-
tial Real Estate Conveyancing, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 57, 73-81 (2005). Stem discusses
the "considerable body of research establishing that individuals have difficulty
changing course once they have made an overt commitment to a certain path or
action." Id. at 73.
16. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAv. & ORc. 39, 44 (1980) ("[A] certain degree of inertia is introduced into the
consumer choice process since goods that are included in the individual's endow-
ment will be more highly valued than those not held in the endowment."). See
generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (discuss-
ing experiments observing endowment effect).
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tion of the total cost of a product. Those effects are considered in
the following Part II.
II.
THE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT TAX
DISCLOSURE SCHEME
The current tax disclosure scheme for consumer goods leads
to interesting and perhaps unexpected effects on consumers. Taxes
that are not presented in the posted price, such as sales taxes, are so
weakly salient that they effectively become hidden from consumers.
Consumers have been shown to undervalue the cost of such hidden
taxes, and indeed, rational and behavioral actor models show that
consumers should be expected to undervalue hidden taxes. As will
be seen, rational actor theory shows that consumers will approxi-
mate the cost of hidden taxes in some situations, and behavioral
analysis builds on the rational actor discovery to show that consum-
ers frequently approximate, and subsequently underestimate, the
cost of taxes. This Part explores these ideas-first establishing that
taxes on consumer goods which are not disclosed at the time the
decision to purchase is made should be expected to become hid-
den, then showing why consumers will undervalue those taxes once
they are hidden.
A. Tax Salience and Hidden Taxes
This Section takes a look at the background literature sur-
rounding tax salience and its effect on the perceived cost of taxes.
Tax salience refers to how noticeable or easy to process taxes are.1 7
Reducing either the ability to notice the tax or the ability to figure
the tax out will result in lower salience. Some taxes are so weakly
salient that they can be aptly described as hidden, in that they "col-
lect revenue or redistribute wealth without also affecting decisions
about whether or where to earn or spend."18 In essence, the idea
behind hidden taxes is that they affect people's behavior less than
they predictably should under traditional economic models of anal-
17. Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 59, 62 (2009) (citing Ed-
ward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects
of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAv. DEC. MAKING 289, 289 (2006) for support of this defi-
nition of "salient" taxes). Chetty et al. offer an alternate definition by defining tax
salience as "the visibility of the tax-inclusive price." Chetty et al., supra note 3, at
1146 n.2. This definition removes considerations of the tax rate. As this Note will
assume that consumers are aware of tax rates, whichever definition the reader
finds more accessible will suffice.
18. Galle, supra note 17, at 61.
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ysis. Hidden taxes could conceivably arise from many different prac-
tices,19 but this Note focuses on taxes that become hidden because
of their low salience levels.
There are two seminal studies in the low salience hidden-tax
literature. The first study concerns tolls paid on roads.20 The author
collected data from 123 toll plazas around the country that had
been in operation since at least 1985. Many of these toll plazas have
electronic toll collection devices which allow drivers to pass through
toll collection sites without having to stop to manually pay the toll
on the road. After comparing the data while controlling for certain
differences, the author found that consumers were less sensitive to
toll increases when they paid through a debit from an electronic
toll collection device, such as E-Z Pass, than when they paid in
cash.2' The author suggests that because of the passive nature of
electronic toll collection, the tolls and toll increases were lowly sali-
ent to electronic toll payers.22 The study found that tolls collected
at facilities with electronic toll collection devices rose on average
20-40% more than facilities without those devices, and it attributed
this finding to the low salience of the tolls. 23 Since the author did
not find a comparative decline in usage with the rise of tolls, it is
possible that electronic toll payers were undervaluing or ignoring
the tolls, as they did not adjust their behavior relative to the in-
crease in toll prices.
The second study had two findings. The first part concerned
taxes on consumer goods in grocery stores, and the second ob-
served the effects of more and less salient taxes on alcoholic bever-
age sales.24 For the first part of the study, the authors presented tax-
inclusive pricing on selected types of consumer goods subject to
sales taxes in a chain of grocery stores for a period of three weeks
19. See generally Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance:
Tax Design as Price Presentation, 10 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189 (2003) (discussing
various pricing techniques such as framing, disaggregation, and timing issues that
could also possibly cause taxes to become hidden). The authors describe how vari-
ous practices can affect price perception, with the idea that businesses would like
for consumers to perceive prices to be lower than they are, to encourage extra
consumption. Id. at 190-98. They then predict that such techniques might also be
able to be used by the government to lower individuals' perception of tax burdens,
focusing mainly on the U.S. income tax. Id.
20. Amy Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 969-71.
21. Id. at 970, 983-86 (discussing methodology and data).
22. Id. at 970-971.
23. Id. at 971.
24. Chetty et al., supra note 3, at 1146.
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and monitored purchasing trends through register scanner data.25
They found that when sales taxes were presented with the price on
the shelf, rather than only at the register, consumers were more
responsive to the taxes. Consumers were shown to buy less of a
product once its total cost was disclosed by the inclusion of tax.2 6
This is direct evidence that the salience of taxes affects the purchas-
ing decisions of consumers because when the taxes were made sali-
ent by increasing their noticeability, consumers altered the
expression of their preferences.
The results from the grocery store part of the study were sup-
ported by a study of taxes on alcoholic beverages. In this study, the
authors compared data on aggregate annual beer consumption by
state, compiled from administrative state tax records, with data on
excise and sales tax rates on beer by state.27 The authors reported
finding that increases in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, which
were included in price and thus highly salient to consumers, caused
a greater decline in consumption than increases in sales taxes,
which were not as salient.28 The authors concluded that this reac-
tion by consumers shows that the salience level of taxes directly im-
pacts consumer purchasing decisions.29
These two studies suggest that consumers undervalue taxes
that are not above a certain level of salience. The remaining sec-
tions of this Part II ask if traditional rational actor and behavioral
analyses can explain this behavior, concluding that they can and
that undervaluation should be expected for a majority of purchases.
B. A Rational Explanation: Rational Ignorance and Approximation
This Section establishes a basic understanding of consumer be-
havior using rational actor theory, which will subsequently be en-
hanced with behavioral analyses. Rational actor theory shows that
consumers can be expected to approximate the cost of hidden
taxes, and behavioral economics then shows that approximation
25. Id. at 1150-53 (describing methodology of grocery store experiment).
One important part of this experiment was that all the similar consumer products
studied had their taxes disclosed. As such, potential confusion between tax-inclu-
sive and tax-exclusive pricing was controlled for. Additionally, the tax-inclusive
price was clearly visible.
26. Id. at 1153-58 (describing results of grocery store experiment). Particu-
larly telling from the results of the experiment is the observation that making a
7.375% sales tax salient decreased demand by 7.6%. Id. at 1155.
27. Id. at 1158-59 (describing methodology of alcohol sales study).
28. Id. at 1160-64 (describing results of alcohol sales study).
29. Id. at 1164 ("This finding supports the claim that the excise tax has a
larger effect on demand than the sales tax because it is fully salient.").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2011] 791
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 66:783
should occur most of the time and that undervaluation of total
costs should be expected when consumers approximate.
Traditional rational actor economic analyses of human behav-
ior assume that "all human behavior can be viewed as involving par-
ticipants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other in-
puts in a variety of markets." 30 Under the most basic of these mod-
els-in which actors are perfectly rational and have perfect
information-taxes could not become hidden. Consumers would
have perfect information about the tax, and even if it was not sali-
ent, the consumer would still consider its cost when making a
purchasing decision. While this basic model is clearly an idealized
view of the world, it offers a good starting place to consider the
effects of hidden taxes. Removing the assumption of perfect infor-
mation provides a much more realistic view of the world, and under
it the rational actor model can explain why some hidden taxes are
not calculated.
A quick note here is important. The analysis in this Section will
focus on how consumers evaluate the imperfect information they
receive regarding taxes. It is important to understand that perfect
rationality will be assumed throughout this analysis in the sense that
consumers will be assumed to make rational decisions based on the
information that they have. For example, if Abe's rational prefer-
ence would be for a candy bar over all other things when the price
is $0.99, it will be assumed that Abe will buy the candy bar and not
something else. This assumption is made because consumer protec-
tion law does not aim to force consumers to make rational choices,
but rather aims to give them the information they need to make
such choices.3 1 However, assuming perfect rationality in the ulti-
mate decision in the presence of imperfect information does not
mean that perfect rationality is used when evaluating imperfect in-
formation.32 The important point of this aside is that when rational-
30. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH To HuMAN BEHAVIOR 14
(1976).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 108-111. The author makes no judg-
ment about this assumption of rationality.
32. Individuals who do not use perfect rationality to evaluate imperfect infor-
mation are said to use "bounded rationality." Bounded rationality occurs because
"[t] he capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for
objectively rational behavior in the real world-or even for a reasonable approxi-
mation to such objective rationality." Thaler, supra note 16, at 40 (quoting HER-
BERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957)). Individuals are unable to process all
of the information they are given so they use shortcuts, or heuristics, to come to
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ity is discussed, it refers to the evaluation of information, not to the
making of the final purchasing decision.
1. Rational Ignorance
When faced with imperfect information, the rational actor will
weigh the opportunity cost of discovering the information against
the cost of acting with the imperfect information.3 3 If there is
greater benefit to acting on full information than on incomplete
information, the missing information will be discovered. The im-
perfect information in the hidden tax scenario is the actual costs of
the taxes, which are not known because they are not disclosed at
the time the consumer makes her purchasing decisions. The cost of
calculation of the cost of the taxes is the sum of the costs of discov-
ering and of applying the tax rate to the price of a product.34 The
cost of ignorance is the cost of the tax minus the cost of time saved
from not calculating. If the cost of calculation is larger than the cost
of ignorance, consumers will intentionally ignore the cost of the
tax.3 5 For example, Betty may be a lawyer making $180 an hour who
wants to buy a $39.99 shirt subject to a 4.75% sales tax that is not
included in the price. Assume that Betty can work whenever she
their final decisions. These decisions may appear irrational when an "incorrect"
choice is made, but technically they are rational on the basis of the information
gained from the shortcuts the individual has used. The use of the shortcuts skews
information and thus can lead to a rationally made irrational choice. SeeJolls et al.,
supra note 12, at 1477-78. In a companion piece to their published article, Chetty
et al., supra note 3, Chetty et al. propose a theory of bounded rationality to explain
the effects of low tax salience. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience And
Taxation: Theory and Evidence 28-35 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 13,330, 2007) [hereinafter Chetty et al., Working Paper], available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3330.
33. BECKER, supra note 30, at 6-7.
34. For the sake of the analysis in this Note, consumers will be assumed to
know the taxes that exist on consumer goods. Chetty et al. make a similar assump-
tion in their article and also provide some anecdotal evidence that consumers are
indeed aware of taxes on consumer goods and the rates of those taxes. See Chetty
et al., supra note 3, at 1165. Whether it is unrealistic or not to assume that individu-
als are aware of all the taxes on consumer goods, individuals' knowledge of taxes,
while closely related to this Note, is beyond the scope of this Note.
35. Chetty et al., Working Paper, supra note 32, at 30-32, and Finkelstein,
supra note 3, at 973-75, 980-83, both propose this idea as a reason for consumer
ignorance of taxes. One can imagine the costs of calculating the cost of the tax
would be quite high when compared to the cost of acting without full information.
Assuming that the existence of all of the taxes on the product is known, the costs
of calculation arise from the need to discover the tax rate and to apply it to the
stated price. The cost of acting without full information is the cost of the tax as-
suming an all-or-nothing approach, but may be smaller than the full cost of the tax
when approximation is taken into account, as noted below.
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likes, for as long as she likes, so that her time is presumptively worth
$0.05 a second. The cost of calculation, assuming it always takes her
30 seconds to figure out the cost of the tax and add it to the price,
is $1.50. The cost of ignorance would be $1.89 - $1.50, or $0.39.
Because the cost of calculation is greater than the cost of igno-
rance, Betty will ignore the tax. If Betty were purchasing a $3999.99
high definition television instead of the shirt, she would calculate
the cost of the tax, since the cost of calculation would remain $1.50,
but the cost of ignorance would jump to $190 - $1.50, or $188.50,
assuming the same 4.75% tax rate.36
The rational ignorance model shows that consumers are more
likely to ignore the cost of taxes when prices are relatively low and
more likely to calculate the cost of taxes when prices rise. However,
calculation and ignorance are not the only two options available to
consumers when considering the cost of hidden taxes. Approxima-
tion of the cost could also occur.
2. Approximation
The rational ignorance model does not have to entail all-or-
nothing ignorance of taxes. Consumers are also able to approxi-
mate the cost of hidden taxes. The cost of approximation is the sum
of the cost of figuring out an approximate cost and the difference
between that approximation and the actual cost, minus the cost of
the time saved from not calculating.37 When the cost of approxima-
tion is less than the costs of calculation and of ignorance, rational
consumers will approximate.
The three situations-ignorance, approximation, and calcula-
tion-should be expected to occur under different circumstances.
Ignorance should be expected when prices are very low, such as
when buying a $1.00 cup of coffee. In such circumstances, the time
needed to form an approximation or to calculate the actual cost of
the tax will cost more to the consumer than the tax itself does.
When prices-and thus the cost of taxes on the product-rise
above a certain level, which can still be relatively low, the cost of the
tax becomes greater than the cost of the time needed to form an
approximation, and approximation will ensue. For example, Chuck
buys a $3.00 cappuccino instead of the $1.00 cup of coffee in a state
36. This example operates under a number of simplifying assumptions, one
of the biggest being that Betty would be able to become aware of the costs of
ignorance and of calculation, but should remain illustrative nonetheless.
37. An approximation could be achieved in a number of ways. For example,
one could approximate using a simple tax rate, such as 10%, or one could simply
add a few dollars to the price.
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where the sales tax is 4.75%. Assume Chuck always approximates by
adding $0.04 for each dollar he spends, and also that his time is
worth $0.01 a second and it takes him five seconds to approximate
rather than ten seconds to calculate. Chuck's cost of approximation
is -$0.03.38 The cost of ignorance is $0.04.3 9The cost of calculation
is $0.10.40 The cost of approximation is less than the costs of igno-
rance and calculation, so Chuck will approximate.
As prices rise, the costs of approximation and of ignorance also
rise, but the cost of calculation remains constant.41 This is because
the cost of calculation is not tied to price, whereas the costs of ap-
proximation and of ignorance are. Therefore, even with approxi-
mation as an option, rational consumers will be more likely to
calculate the costs of taxes as prices rise. 42
In all likelihood, rational consumers will find approximation to
be valuable for a significant number of goods purchased. Because
the practice of approximation suggests that consumers might un-
dervalue some taxes while overvaluing others, hidden taxes might
not necessarily lead to undervaluation by consumers of their total
tax burden. One might expect an averaging out of overestimation
and underestimation of tax burdens such that the end result comes
close to the actual tax burden, resulting in no significant net con-
sumer harm. Rational actors should also be able to learn from past
mistakes and become increasingly accurate in their approxima-
tions, reducing each individual instance of harm.43 Therefore,
traditional rational actor models cannot fully explain the underval-
uation of hidden taxes and likely assume too much about the cogni-
38. Cost of approximation = -$0.03 = $0.05 [cost of figuring out approxima-
tion] + $0.02 [cost of tax ($0.14) - approximated cost ($0.12)] - $0.10 [cost of
time saved from not calculating]. In this case, Chuck receives a benefit from ap-
proximating, seen from the fact that the cost is negative.
39. Cost of ignorance = $0.04 = $0.14 [cost of tax] - $0.10 [cost of time saved
from not calculating].
40. Cost of calculation = $0.10 = $0.01 (cost of time] * 10 [time to calculate].
41. Chetty et al., Working Paper, supra note 32, at 34. ("[T]he cognitive cost is
a fixed amount paid at each transaction, whereas the benefit of computing [the
tax-inclusive price] scales up with expenditure on the good.").
42. This observation assumes that the marginal utility of money remains con-
stant. Otherwise, if individuals making expensive purchases have a decreasing mar-
ginal utility of money (perhaps because they are wealthy), then the cost of
ignorance will decrease as the utility of each dollar lost decreases.
43. See Lawrence E. Blume & David Easley, Rational Expectations and Rational
Learning, in ORGANIZATIONS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC
ANALYsis: A TRIBUTE TO Roy RADNER 61, 65-76 (Mukul Majumdar ed., 1998) (dis-
cussing the dynamics of learning in the context of single-actor decisionmaking).
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tive capabilities of consumers.4 4 Further development is needed.
Removing the assumption thus far of perfect rationality opens the
door to cognitive explanations that explain why undervaluation of
hidden taxes should be expected in almost every case.
C. A Behavioral Explanation: Behavioral Ignorance
and Undervaluation
This Section will use behavioral analysis to supplement the ra-
tional actor model of consumer behavior in response to hidden
taxes developed in the previous section. In particular, cognitive bi-
ases explain both why consumers should not be expected to calcu-
late the costs of hidden taxes and why approximation will lead to
undervaluation in almost all cases. These cognitive biases raise the
cost of information, making it unlikely that consumers will find it
worthwhile to calculate the cost of hidden taxes for most of their
purchases.
1. Behavioral Ignorance
The rational actor model would have consumers calculate the
cost of taxes when the cost of calculation is less than the cost of
acting with imperfect information. This Section explores cognitive
biases and processes that raise the cost of calculation in the rational
actor model. 4 5 The cost of calculation can become so high that con-
sumers will likely never calculate the cost of hidden taxes. Some of
the biases and errors most relevant to this idea include a lack of
computational skills needed to figure out the tax burden, 4 6 the pos-
sibility of hyperbolic discounters who do not correctly value future
44. See Galle, supra note 17, at 83 (noting evidence that consumers' choices
are not always the result of considered reflection).
45. See id. at 83-84 (surveying cognitive processes that could lead to igno-
rance of taxes).
46. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics:
Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers, in BEHAVIORAL Eco-
NOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONs 7, 24-25 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds.,
2007); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 93 Am. ECON. REv. 1449, 1453, 1459, 1464 (2003); Daniel Read, George
Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin, Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171,
187 (1999).
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events,4 7 and the possibility that people have trouble combining the
cost of the tax with the price even when it is figured out.4 8
For example, Dave might lack the ability to multiply a $3.99
loaf of bread by a 4.75% sales tax rate, raising the cost of calculation
to a relatively high level-perhaps the cost of calculator-which
would outweigh the cost of approximation, probably just a few cents
in this case. Dave should be expected to approximate or ignore the
tax. Emily might be able to make the calculation of the tax on the
loaf of bread, but is a hyperbolic discounter who incorrectly under-
values the future benefit of calculating the tax and thus ignores the
cost of the tax. She may think that the value of her current time
saved by not calculating the cost of tax is worth more than the fu-
ture $0.19 of tax, only to find at the register that she was wrong and
should not have ignored the cost of the tax.49 Finally, Frank might
have the ability to calculate the tax, but experiences frustration and
confusion when trying to add it to the price, adding to his cost of
calculation, and opts to avoid this burden by approximating or ig-
noring the tax. It might seem counterintuitive that Frank could
multiply but not add, but if the sales tax were a simple 10% and the
price was $3.99, there could conceivably be some initial confusion
and frustration at adding $0.39 to $3.99, enough that Frank might
prefer just to approximate the total price.
These behaviors can explain why actors would not calculate the
cost of hidden taxes within the rational actor model.50 While one
could argue that these are irrational behaviors, where the consumer
does not weigh the cost of calculation against the cost of acting with
47. See R. H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23
REv. ECON. STUD. 165, 170-71, 177-78 (1955) (describing effects of time on a con-
sumer's optimal demand curve); see generally Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein
& Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002) (reviewing literature on myopia). Hyperbolic dis-
counting is also referred to as "myopia" and is discussed again below, infra text
accompanying note 57.
48. See Kahneman, supra note 46, at 1459.
49. Procrastination is a common expression of myopia. The pain of doing
something now feels much greater than of doing that same thing in the future,
though technically the pain should be the same (barring changed circumstances).
50. In addition, taxation schemes vary from state to state and even from good
to good within each state. For the purpose of simplicity, this Note assumes that
consumers are aware of the taxes on consumer goods, see supra note 34, but to the
extent that they actually are not aware of the taxes, these two forms of variations
could significantly increase the cognitive costs of calculating taxes to a point where
consumers give up on calculation in most cases.
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imperfect information at all,5 1 it is more accurate to consider them
as supplementing the understanding obtained through the rational
actor model by increasing the cost of calculation. 5 2 In addition to
explaining why calculation should not be expected, behavioral anal-
ysis further shows that consumers will undervalue costs when they
approximate.
2. Undervaluation
The rational actor model showed that when consumers do not
calculate the costs of taxes, they will approximate those costs unless
price is very low. Consumers can approximate the costs of taxes di-
rectly by estimating the costs and adding them to the posted price
of a product or indirectly by simply estimating the total cost of a
product. Regardless of the means of approximation, behavioral
analysis shows that approximation leads to systematic undervalua-
tion of taxes. Given the results of the studies, undervaluation may
be expected. Even so, it could be expected that consumers would
overestimate the cost of taxes. Therefore, it is important to establish
why consumers will undervalue the costs of hidden taxes when they
do elect to approximate.
The universe of behavioral economics is quite large, and this
Note will address cognitive biases that are some of the strongest
indicators of consumers' tendency to underestimate the cost of
taxes. The discussion here is not meant to be exhaustive. It exam-
ines the anchoring bias, the disaggregation bias, the optimism bias,
and consumer myopia. These biases do not operate in a vacuum
and a consumer may suffer from multiple biases, however, for ease,
their effects are explained individually.
The anchoring bias causes individuals to gravitate towards a
starting point when making estimations.53 The bias can take hold
even if the starting point is not an accurate value for whatever is
being considered, although starting points that are close to being
51. Galle, supra note 17, at 83-84 (providing examples of situations where
consumers do not calculate taxes regardless of the cost of avoiding taxation).
52. Jolls et al. note that "[t] he project of behavioral law and economics. .. is
to take the core insights and successes of economics and build upon them by mak-
ing more realistic assumptions about human behavior." Jolls et al., supra note 12,
at 1487.
53. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974); see also Stern, supra note 15, at 78
("Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which starting points or initial values
systematically and disproportionately influence decision makers.").
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accurate create a stronger bias.54 Anchoring affects consumers who
engage in indirect approximation of the cost of the tax. If consum-
ers see the presented tax-exclusive price as the starting point for
estimating the total cost of the product, then they are likely to un-
derestimate the total cost, and implicitly the cost of the tax, by stay-
ing too close to the posted price. Returning to the $3.99 loaf of
bread, with the anchoring bias Greg might approximate the total
cost of the bread, but stay too close to the posted price, even if he
understood abstractly that the cost of the tax should add more to
the price. Under a 4.75% sales tax, Greg might approximate the
total cost at $4.10 when the actual cost is $4.18.
Closely related to the anchoring bias is the disaggregation bias.
The disaggregation bias causes individuals to underestimate the to-
tal cost of a product when prices are presented as broken down in
smaller parts.55 This undervaluation occurs because individuals
have difficulty adding the parts together and will thus gravitate to-
ward the most salient parts of the price and undervalue the less
salient parts of the price. It stands to reason therefore, that by mak-
ing prices tax-exclusive, the total cost of the product will be under-
estimated because the tax will be undervalued as the smaller, less
salient part of the total cost, even if the initial estimation is fairly
accurate. For example, Henry, suffering from the disaggregation
bias, might have trouble adding together the two price components
of his bread purchase-the $3.99 posted price and $0.19 of tax-
and thus focus on the larger and more salient $3.99, finding it eas-
ier to do so while adding a few cents on the top to account for the
tax he knows is there.
Further, the optimism bias, which basically states that individu-
als do not rationally perceive negative events in their lives and thus
undervalue their impact or probability, suggests that consumers
who were not certain of their tax liability would tend to undervalue
54. Stern, supra note 15, at 79 (noting that "[r]esearchers have found anchor-
ing effects even when the anchor presented is uninformative or extreme," but also
that "the anchoring effect is strongest when the anchor is moderate rather than
extreme").
55. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 19, at 192-94 (citing various pieces of
experimental data pointing to disaggregation bias phenomenon); see alsojohn M.
Clark & Sidne G. Ward, Consumer Behavior in Online Auctions: An Examination of
Partitioned Prices on eBay, 16 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAc. 57, 57-66 (2008);
Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equiva-
lence in Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCEs ECON. ANALYsis & POL'Y, no. 2, art. 2,
2006, at 1-4. See generally Vicki G. Morwitz, Eric A. Greenleaf & Eric J. Johnson,
Divide and Prosper: Consumers' Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J. MARKETING RES.
453, 453-63 (1998).
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its negative impact on them: they would assume the tax is not as big
as it is.56 Isabelle might see a 4.75% sales tax on the $3.99 loaf of
bread and assume that there is no way its cost could be as high as
$0.19. Thus, she will underestimate its cost, perhaps as $0.10.
Consumer myopia refers to the tendency in individuals to un-
dervalue future expenses and overvalue current expenses.5 7 Myopia
causes consumers to give undue weight to the posted price and un-
dervalue the impact of the hidden tax, which can be considered a
future expense since it is not disclosed at the time the posted price
is disclosed, but figured out or approximated sometime thereafter.
Jenny might be aware that a tax exists on a $3.99 loaf of bread, but
be unsure what it will be. Since myopia causes future harms to seem
less painful, Jenny will assume the cost of the tax to be less than
what it will actually be.
These biases explain why consumers will undervalue the costs
of hidden taxes. When combined together they can create powerful
cognitive hurdles to accurate approximation. However, there may
be some cognitive processes that would tend to push consumers in
the other direction, processes that would diminish the harm from
undervaluing hidden taxes. The next Section explores those
processes and finds that consumers should not be able to signifi-
cantly mitigate the harms from undervaluing taxes.
3. Can Consumers Mitigate the Effects of Hidden Taxes?
Processes of bias removal and of preference ordering imply
that the harms resulting from the undervaluation of hidden taxes
should be short lived or minimal in the long run.5 8 Consumers suf-
fering harm from their biases are thus incentivized to correct those
biases.59 Individuals can learn of the taxes themselves or third par-
56. See generally David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The
Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IN-
TUITIVE JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds.,
2002) (reviewing and discussing optimism bias); see alsoJ.D. Trout, Paternalism and
Cognitive Bias, 24 L. & PHIL. 393, 403-04 (2005) (discussing how overconfidence
can make individuals overly optimistic about their abilities to evaluate
information).
57. For literature regarding myopia, see supra note 47.
58. Galle, supra note 17, at 85. As will be seen in Part IV, bias removal is ex-
actly what this Note argues for. However, the process referred to here is individu-
als' ability to remove biases without government action.
59. Id. at 89 (citingJonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation
of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1620, 1647-48
(2006)).
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ties can intervene and inform the individuals. However, problems
abound with processes of bias removal. 60
Initially, it will be hard for irrational individuals to remove
their own biases. They would have to be aware that they were con-
stantly underestimating. As the harm to each individual is not sub-
stantial, the injury causing the harm may be hard to locate. Assume
that an individual overspends by $10 a month due to undervaluing
hidden taxes. Only the most pious of bookkeepers would likely be
able to discover that the $10 of harm resulted from undervaluing
taxes and not some other expenditure or mistake, such as simply
dropping a ten dollar bill. Also, if individuals do not check their
estimations each time, they will not be able to correct themselves
very easily.
Even third parties that attempt to alert individuals to the hid-
den taxes may be met with some resistance from consumers if they
are not offering simple disclosures of total price, as advocated for in
this Note.61 Notably, consumers are the ones who actually go to the
store and see what they buy and how much it costs. Because con-
sumers have first-hand information on their own purchases, they
may simply not believe the others who do not have that infonna-
tion. Furthermore, as the harm on each individual purchase is
likely to be relatively small, the consumers may just not care about it
once it is revealed to them, a reaction that hearkens back to disag-
gregation theory. Consumers may thus have a hard time realizing
the aggregate harm they suffer. Optimism bias would cause con-
sumers to believe that the harm that the groups reveal is not hap-
pening to them, but to other consumers. These and other cognitive
biases and errors will lead consumers to dismiss the watchdog
groups' claims of serious harm.
It is also argued that the effects of undervaluing hidden taxes
are minimal because of consumer ordering of preferences, which is
the idea that consumers will anticipate that some unknown income
effects will adversely affect their budgets and thus they will purchase
the goods they prefer the most before purchasing the goods they
prefer the least.62 Therefore, because the consumers are only de-
60. See id. at 89-93 (discussing complications with effectiveness of bias
removal).
61. See id. at 90-92 (discussing potential problems of external actors attempt-
ing to educate taxpayers on their tax burdens including noisy signals and credibil-
ity issues).
62. See id. at 79-80; see also Chetty et al. Working Paper, supra note 32, at
41-46 (describing various possibilities of how consumer may order his
preferences).
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nied their least preferred goods, the harm incurred is presumably
minimized. It is unclear though that individuals order preferences
in such a way, and the anticipation scenario rests on rather unstable
ground. 63 Regardless, this idea admits undervaluation and the
harm, but attempts to justify them by claiming that the harm is not
that great. However, income effects of taxes are real, and where
income is lost, it should not matter if it is on the front or back end
of consumer preferences. Consumers will have lost the ability to
spend their money and express their preferences accurately. On
balance then, processes of bias removal and preference ordering
are not likely to counterbalance the effects of the anchoring bias,
the disaggregation bias, the optimism bias, and consumer myopia.
In conclusion, Part II has examined how consumers react to
hidden taxes created by low salience levels. Consumers can process
these hidden taxes in three ways: by ignoring them, approximating
them, or calculating them. Given consumers' imperfect rationality
when considering hidden taxes, it should be expected that they will
not calculate the costs of the taxes for the majority of their
purchases, but rather will approximate or ignore them, leading to
undervaluation of those costs.
III.
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
Part II established that consumers should be expected to un-
dervalue the cost of hidden taxes in almost all situations. Part III
will examine the impact of undervaluation on both social and indi-
vidual consumer welfare. As will be seen, the social impacts are
somewhat speculative, but can be described in general terms. It is
likely that hidden taxes lead to over-taxation and that they are re-
gressive. Taxes are regressive when they impact poorer consumers
more than wealthy consumers.64 Regressive taxes impose less of an
effective burden on individuals as their wealth increases.65 Regres-
63. Galle, supra note 17, at 80, 87-89 (noting that it is unclear if consumers
actually calculate taxes, and if they do, whether they act rationally with that infor-
mation); see also Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behav-
ioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MARKETING 8, 10 (2006).
64. See BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009) (defining regressive tax);
accord Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1908 (1987) ("Under a re-
gressive tax, the percentage of income paid to the government falls as income
rises, although the absolute amount paid to the government may rise, fall, or re-
main constant.").
65. Galle, supra note 17, at 69, 102.
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sive taxes create welfare concerns because they burden one class of
individuals-the poor-more than another-the rich-even
though it is thought that the rich have the better ability to pay. The
impact on individuals is much clearer. Undervaluation causes indi-
viduals to over-consume, 6 6 resulting in individual welfare losses.67
A. Society
Section A explains the effects of hidden taxes on social welfare.
The effects that the undervaluation of hidden taxes has on social
welfare are not entirely clear, but can be discussed generally. On
the one hand, some argue that undervaluation will lead to over-
taxation and that hidden taxes are particularly regressive. 6 8 On the
other hand, some argue that undervaluation can increase social
welfare by reducing the deadweight losses associated with the
taxes.69
Finkelstein's study addresses the over-taxation issue and fo-
cuses on fiscal illusion.7o This bias is said to cause individuals to
undervalue the cost of government when they are unaware of gov-
ernment revenues.71 If individuals are unaware of taxes-whether
from fiscal illusion or something else 2-then opportunists in gov-
ernment may use this ignorance to tax people more heavily than is
66. See supra Part II.A.; infra Appendix, Figure 2.
67. See William Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral
Economics and Tax Policy 8 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15,328, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5328 ("[W]ith a bind-
ing budget constraint, spending too much on the good with a hidden tax will leave
less income for subsequent purchases-distorting individual consumption and de-
creasing welfare.").
68. Galle, supra note 17, at 93-104 (suggesting that hidden taxes could lead
to over-taxation and to regressive taxation).
69. Id. at 93; see also Congdon et al., supra note 67, at 10.
70. Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 970.
71. See generally Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of the Fiscal
Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FiscAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF Rus-
SELL MATHEWS 65 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (discussing different ver-
sions of fiscal illusion hypothesis and examining empirical studies); Brian E.
Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion, 10 J.
ECON. SURvs. 261 (1996) (examining and evaluating empirical research on five
main hypotheses within fiscal illusion).
72. Oates finds that a persuasive case for the fiscal illusion has not yet been
made. See Oates, supra note 71, at 65-66. However, to the extent that it does exist,
it only mandates that individuals be shown the revenues the government brings in.
In the case of consumer goods, the cost of taxes is presented on receipts, so con-
sumers have the opportunity to see what the government is taking in from them.
For the purposes of this Note's discussion of over-taxation, it is not particularly
important why individuals are ignoring their taxes, only that they are ignored.
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necessary. It may also simply be the case that when taxes are not
properly evaluated because they are hidden, they may not be set at
an optimal level.73 Taxpayers might accept over-taxation because
they perceive the tax rate to be at an acceptable level. No bad actors
are necessary in this scenario. Finkelstein's study provides some ro-
bust evidence that hidden taxes can lead to non-optimal taxation;
her study found evidence of over-taxation.74 Indeed, over-taxation
has been a concern since at least the time ofJohn Stuart Mill,75 and
such over-taxation seems a very likely result of the undervaluation
of hidden taxes.
As to the regressivity concern, given the nature of hidden taxes
and the processes that cause people to ignore them, poorer con-
sumers will likely be disproportionately affected by the hidden
taxes. Such consumers' cognitive abilities are likely not as devel-
oped as richer consumers, which would predictably lead to less ac-
curate estimations of the cost of hidden taxes.76 In addition, poorer
consumers are likely to spend a higher proportion of their budgets
than rich consumers on inexpensive items, which should lead to
more approximation or ignorance of tax costs, especially where
cognitive costs are higher for poorer consumers. If poor consumers
are disproportionately affected by hidden taxes, then hidden taxes
may be said to be regressive.77 Finally, sales taxes, which are some of
the most prominent hidden taxes, are widely recognized as regres-
73. The widely accepted and used basic model for determining what taxation
scheme is optimal is found in James Mirrlees's seminal 1971 article An Exploration
in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Under the Mirrlees model, the goal of
government is to choose a tax structure that maximizes the welfare of society as
defined by a social welfare function. SeeJ. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of
Optimal Income Taxation, 38 REv. ECON. STUD. 175, 178 (1971).
74. See Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 991-1005 (describing impact of electronic
toll collection on political behavior).
75. See 2JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY wrr SOME OF
THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 491-93 (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1892) (1848).
76. Galle, supra note 17, at 102-03 ("[A] regressive influence is the likelihood
that the disutility of engaging in calculations diminishes as wealth increases. More
precisely, it seems likely that the difficulty of carrying out mathematical operations
declines with education, and education correlates with wealth. Wealthier individu-
als may also have computational aids, such as an accountant on speed-dial, that are
unavailable to those of more modest means. . . . [E]ducation seems likely to im-
prove taxpayers capacity to observe and compute taxes, and, again, education is
strongly correlated with wealth.").
77. Id. at 100 ("[I]f the likelihood that a consumer will pay sales taxes rather
than shift to a consumption decision that is not taxed correlates with lower in-
come, then imposing hidden sales tax will result in a more regressive tax
structure.").
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sive.78 If they become hidden, sales taxes' regressive effects might
seem smaller than they actually are and thus more socially accept-
able. While this doesn't affect the actual regressive impact of the
taxes, it could cause society to be less willing to address the impact.
Of course, high taxes and regressive taxes do not necessarily
represent a social welfare cost. If taxpayers are receiving benefits
greater than or equal to the costs of the taxes, then there is not
necessarily a social welfare problem, though the taxes may not be
optimal. High taxes could lead to a plethora of public benefits, and
these benefits could disproportionately accrue to the poor, remov-
ing net regressivity concerns. However, in a federal system, horizon-
tal fiscal externalities-the effects of the abilities of citizens to move
to different taxing jurisdictions-can cause states to compete away
redistributive objectives, thus causing state tax regimes to be more
regressive.79 Thus, to the extent that hidden taxes are state sales
taxes, they are likely to be regressive.80
Additionally, there is an idea that the undervaluation of hid-
den taxes causes consumers to express pre-tax preferences, thereby
reducing the substitution effects of the taxes.81 The substitution ef-
fect of a tax is the change in preferences it causes.82 For example,
Kosha may prefer a $5.00 magazine in a tax-free world, but once a
tax is imposed on magazines, the substitution effect of the tax
causes her to prefer a $4.50 magazine instead. The actual economic
effect the market feels from this substitution effect is referred to as
"deadweight loss".8 3 When pre-tax consumer preferences are ex-
pressed, the effect that society feels from the deadweight loss associ-
ated with taxes may be lessened because of the absence (or
78. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MusGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 331-32 (2d ed. 1976).
79. See Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand & Marianne Vigneault, The Conse-
quences of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation,
68J. PUB. ECON. 453, 474 (1998); see also David E. Wildasin, Income Redistribution in
a Common Labor Market, 81 Am. ECON. REv. 757, 761-65 (1991) (outlining model
showing externalities of localized redistribution in federal system).
80. One instance where there would not be net regressivity concerns would
be where taxes that have become hidden are solely dedicated to funding social
welfare programs.
81. Galle, supra note 17, at 77-79, 93; Congdon et al., supra note 67, at 10.
The idea here is that hidden taxes presumably have no effect on purchasing deci-
sions, thus removing the expected substitution effect of the tax and eliminating
the resulting deadweight loss.
82. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1919-20.
83. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 33-35, 49-50,
548-58 (2005); MUSGRAVE, supra note 78, at 461-71. For a graphical representa-
tion of deadweight loss, see Figure 1 in the attached Appendix.
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lessening) of the substitution effect, creating a more robust market-
place. 84 While this argument has some initial appeal, it rests on ten-
uous ground because its focus on aggregate markets ignores the
income effect on welfare felt by individual consumers.85 The in-
come effect of a tax refers to the fact that it costs more to buy the
same goods after they have been taxed, thus more income is re-
quired to maintain pre-tax preferences, causing the value of income
to increase.86 This income effect could cause individuals to work
more, save less, or take on more debt-any of which could have
negative impacts on social welfare. What is important to take from
these ideas is that the social welfare costs of the undervaluation of
hidden taxes are somewhat unclear, but it is likely that over-taxa-
tion and regressive taxation result. The next Section examines the
harm to individuals resulting from the undervaluation of taxes.
Compared with the social harms, the individual harms are rather
straightforward.
B. Individuals
Given that consumers undervalue hidden taxes, tax-exclusive
pricing injures consumer welfare by causing consumers to over-con-
sume.87 Overconsumption causes consumers to suffer due to the
unexpected income effects of the hidden taxes.88 As a result, con-
sumers must save less money than they expected, work more than
they would prefer, take on more debt than they would prefer, or
consume less overall than they initially preferred when they
thought their tax burden would be smaller. Authors of many stud-
ies have noted that such results are expected in the real world, as
evidenced by sellers' anticipations that sales would decline with tax-
inclusive pricing.89
Even though the actual income effect of the undervaluation of
each individual hidden tax may be slight, even slight harms such as
these spread over such a large number of purchases and a large
84. For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Chetty et. al., supra note 3, at
1173.
85. Galle, supra note 17, at 79.
86. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1920.
87. See infra app. fig.2.
88. Congdon et al., supra note 67, at 8 ("[Wlith a binding budget constraint,
spending too much on the good with a hidden tax will leave less income for subse-
quent purchases-distorting individual consumption and decreasing welfare.").
89. Chetty et al., supra note 3, at 1150 ("The grocery chain's managers ex-
pected that posting tax-inclusive prices would reduce sales."); see also Bird, supra
note 14, at 70-71.
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number of people can create substantial harm. 90 Consumers are
undervaluing taxes on a number of purchases every day, and one
could estimate that each individual consumer's yearly harm is not
insignificant, even if each purchase only results in a few pennies
worth of harm.91 However, the effect of losing a few pennies on
each purchase does not make the harm salient enough to compel
action from any individual consumer, creating a classic collective
action problem.92
Further, the harm from hidden taxes is not outweighed by any
countervailing benefits. The undervaluation itself does not directly
benefit individuals in their capacity as consumers but could indi-
rectly benefit them by increasing social welfare. However, as already
discussed, social welfare is not necessarily raised by the undervalua-
tion of hidden taxes. Hidden taxes appear to be regressive in na-
ture, thus causing individual welfare losses for poorer consumers.
These welfare losses are relatively more painful to poorer consum-
ers, who should be expected to undervalue hidden taxes with a
greater degree of error than wealthier individuals. Also, if the un-
dervaluation of hidden taxes results in over-taxation, then individu-
als are not receiving an optimal set of benefits from the
government. Thus, overtaxed consumers are being harmed because
their income could be better spent. Finally, even if the undervalua-
tion of hidden taxes reduces the deadweight loss of the substitution
effect of taxes, individual consumers suffer from the income effects.
It is clear therefore that tax-exclusive pricing harms individual
consumer welfare by creating hidden taxes that cause consumers to
over-consume. This practice does not have any countervailing bene-
fits for individual welfare, and naturally leads to the question of
90. See Chetty et al. Working Paper, supra note 32, at 3 ("Even though individ-
ual welfare may be minimally affected by ignoring taxes, the same taxes can have
large impacts on social welfare and tax revenue."). The Federal Trade Commission
has also recognized that small individual harms can lead to substantial harms when
a large number of people are affected. For example, one purpose for enacting the
FTC Octane Rule was to prevent millions of consumers from spending a few extra
pennies per gallon when buying gasoline. See Posting of Minimum Octane Num-
bers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,871, 23,872 (Dec. 16, 1971)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 306).
91. For example, if a consumer made five purchases a day and underesti-
mated the cost by an average of $0.05 on each purchase, then he alone would
suffer $91 of harm yearly.
92. E.g. Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing
Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg. at 23,875 (discussing how consumers were unable to individu-
ally obtain information that they needed, creating a collective action problem that
the rule sought to remedy).
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whether consumers should be protected from tax-exclusive pricing.
That question is answered affirmatively in the next Part.
IV.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Given the welfare implications of undervaluing hidden taxes
established in the last Part, consumers should be protected from
tax-exclusive pricing on consumer goods. Individual welfare is be-
ing harmed by the systematic undervaluing of hidden taxes. Con-
sumers' inability to overcome their biases and accurately consider
the cost of hidden taxes prohibits market forces from eliminating
the harm. If consumers are unable to correctly value the tax, then
sellers who include tax will suffer in open competition because
their prices will be perceived as higher than the prices of sellers
who do not include the tax. Therefore, a competitive market will
lead to tax-exclusive pricing to the ultimate detriment of the con-
sumer.93 Market failures such as this one "open [ ] the door to the
possibility of welfare-enhancing legal intervention." 94 As the federal
consumer protection agency, the Federal Trade Commission has
the power and responsibility to intervene and should use its
rulemaking authority to establish a minimally intrusive rule man-
dating tax-inclusive pricing.
A. Who Should Act, and Why
1. The Federal Trade Commission
The federal agency charged with protecting consumers is the
FTC.9 5 Using its authority granted in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act (FTCA) ,96 the FTC has tackled a wide range of practices
causing consumer injury. Examples of previous actions include
mandating disclosure of octane levels in gasoline,'9 7 mandating the
disclosure of proper care standards for garments,98 creating strict
rules for the presentation of the prices for funeral parlor services
93. It is admitted that some sellers do present tax-inclusive prices, but this
observation about the effects of competition should explain why so few sellers do
choose to present tax-inclusive prices.
94. Oren Bar-Gill, Informing Consumers About Themselves 43 (N.Y. Univ. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-44, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1056381.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
96. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
97. 16 C.F.R. § 306.10 (2010).
98. 16 C.F.R. § 423.3 (2010).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
808
CONSUMERS AND TAX-EXCLUSIVE PRICING
and goods,99 creating strict disclosure requirements for
franchisors, 00 and regulating credit practices. 0 1
The FTC's position as the federal consumer protection agency
makes it the best actor to tackle the problems surrounding hidden
taxes. While it may seem unclear who should act since the problems
involve taxes, this murkiness is easily dissipated. The problem arises
not from the taxes themselves, but from the fact that the taxes are
not disclosed on the price tag. Therefore, the injury arises from the
choice of sellers not to include taxes in their prices. Since this is a
trade practice that is adversely affecting consumers, the FTC has
jurisdiction.
Granted, there is the issue that taxes are not imposed by sellers
on consumers. It is therefore unclear that sellers should be respon-
sible for disclosing taxes. Even so, sellers are responsible for the
practice of tax-exclusive pricing and benefit from it at the expense
of consumers. The FTC has regulated similar practices in the past,
as exemplified by rules concerning fees such as shipping and han-
dling fees' 0 2 or per call fees.103 Even though such costs are not con-
sidered part of the price of the product, the Commission still
requires that sellers disclose them to consumers, since they are part
of the total cost. It follows from this observation that since taxes are
part of the total cost, though not part of the price, they also are
prime for similar FTC action. Also, at the most basic level, sellers
are the least-cost providers of such information, as it would cost
them next to nothing to provide the tax information.l0 4 On this
basis alone, they are ideal candidates to disclose the information.105
99. 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2010).
100. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2 (2010).
101. 16 C.F.R. § 444 (2010).
102. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a) (1) (2010) (requiring total cost to consumer to be
disclosed before payment in telemarketing sales).
103. 16 C.F.R. § 308.3 (2010) (requiring disclosure of cost of call for pay-per-
call service).
104. Bar-Gill, supra note 94, at 63.
105. Cf Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-
Avoider, 78 VA. L. REv. 1291, 1306 (1992) (discussing general understanding that
assigning liability to least-cost avoider in tort actions leads to efficient level of
care). The argument for efficient results in tort by assigning liability to the least-
cost avoider is easily translatable to the current discussion. The harm from tax-
exclusive pricing could be corrected by sellers, the government, or consumers
themselves. In any scenario, the cost of fixing the harm is likely to fall on consum-
ers. Sellers will pass any costs along in price, the government will collect more
taxes or decrease spending (although neither of these technically have to affect
consumers) to account for any costs, and consumers would bear their own costs,
which have been shown to be high. Since sellers can disclose taxes most cheaply, as
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2. Consumer Protection
It is important to understand how the FTC exercises its con-
sumer protection authority. Consumer protection laws are designed
to ensure that consumers have the ability to choose effectively be-
tween different options in the marketplace. Such choices require
that consumers possess the information reasonably necessary to ac-
curately express their preferences and that they are not misled by
certain trade practices.106 Therefore, the federal law of consumer
protection as found in section 5 of the FTCA prohibits "unfair and
deceptive trade practices."107
Consumer protection law and interpretation of the FTCA are
guided by the principle of protecting consumer sovereignty. 08
Consumer sovereignty is an expression of the ideal that consumers
should have both the opportunity to define their desires and the
opportunity to act to fulfill those desires. 109 Implicit in the defini-
tion of consumer sovereignty and in the current analysis of con-
sumer injuries is that consumers make rational decisions." 0 Thus,
when consumers are given choices and the information needed to
choose, they will perfectly express their preferences, and markets
will operate efficiently by responding to consumer demand rather
than government directives or business preferences."1
The FTCA in its current form is a rather vague grant of power.
Congress intended for the FTC to develop a framework for identify-
ing unfair trade practices and recognized the Commission's need
for flexibility in this area, since prohibiting specific actions would
have simply driven offenders to find loopholes and new methods of
they are already responsible for displaying price to consumers, they are the least-
cost provider of the information (or least-cost avoider of the harm). Therefore,
they should be required to provide the tax information.
106. Averitt & Lande, supra note 6, at 713-14.
107. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
108. Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 281 (1981).
109. Averitt & Lande, supra note 6, at 713.
110. See Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061 (1984) ("The Commission
does not ordinarily seek to mandate specific conduct or specific social outcomes,
but rather seeks to ensure simply that markets operate freely, so that consumers
can make their own decisions."); Thomas B. Leary, Unfairness and the Internet, 46
WAYNE L. REv. 1711, 1713 (2000) (noting that current standard "gives primacy to
economic factors, and introduces the notion of consumer responsibility"); Joel
Waldfogel, Does Consumer Irrationality Trump Consumer Sovereignty?, 87 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 691, 691 (2005) (stating that consumer sovereignty and rationality is central
to economic theory, although empirical evidence suggests otherwise).
111. Averitt & Lande, supra note 6, at 715-16.
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exploiting consumers.112 The original framework, the "S&H"
test, 13 was used until 1980. It examined whether the act or practice
in question 1) violated established public policy, 2) was immoral or
unethical, or 3) resulted in substantial consumer injury.'1 4 A 1980
letter from the FTC to Congress outlined a modified version of this
test.115 The letter explained that unjustified consumer injury would
112. See S. REP. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) ("The committee gave careful consid-
eration to the question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and
variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continu-
ance or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair practices,
leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded
that the latter course would be the better, for the reason ... that there were too
many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would
be quite possible to invent others."); see also H.R. REP. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914)
("It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is
no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake
an endless task."). The Supreme Court has also acknowledged this need for flexi-
bility. See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934) ("Neither the lan-
guage nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to confine the
forbidden methods to fixed and unyielding categories."); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643, 648 (1931) ("[U]nfair methods of competition... belongs to that class of
phrases which does not admit of precise definition."). The Court has also recog-
nized that the Commission is responsible for developing the framework for discov-
ering unfair trade practices. See id. at 649 ("[T]he Commission is called upon first
to determine, as a necessary prerequisite to the issue of a complaint, whether there
is reason to believe that a given person, partnership or corporation has been or is
using any unfair method of competition in commerce."); Ad. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381
U.S. 357, 367 (1965) ("In a broad delegation of power it empowers the Commis-
sion, in the first instance, to determine whether a method of competition or the
act or practice complained of is unfair.").
113. The "S&H" test derives its name from the Supreme Court case FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). In that case, the Supreme Court
acquiesced in the FTC's framework for finding unfair trade practices. Id. at 244-45
& n.5.
114. Id. at 244 n.5 (1972) (recognizing framework as established in Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 408)).
115. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,203 (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter FTC
Unfairness Policy Statement] (letter from the FTC to the Consumer Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation). The S&H
framework is reproduced in the FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, although in
slightly different order. Id. 20,908. However, the letter effectively eliminates the
"immoral or unethical" prong of the original test and modifies the import of the
other two prongs.
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thereafter be the main focus of unfairness investigations.' 1 6 Public
policy was to be used only as evidence that certain types of conduct
cause consumer injury,1 17 and the immorality question was consid-
ered duplicative.11 8 This was all codified as 15 U.S.C. § 45(n),119
consequently superceding the S&H test.
The Commission has stated that for a consumer injury to be
legally unfair it "must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by
any countervailing benefits to consumers ... that the practice pro-
duces; and it must be an injury that consumers themselves could
not reasonably have avoided."o20 An injury's harm can be substan-
tial if it harms either a small group of consumers in a large way1 21
or a large group of consumers in a small way.122 When considering
the net effects of the practice to determine if its benefits outweigh
its costs, the Commission may choose to consider the effects on the
ultimate consumer only, ignoring the effects the practice has on
sellers or even the government. 123 The Commission seeks to deter-
116. Id. at 20,908 ("Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the
FTC Act, and the most important of the three S & H criteria.").
117. Id. at 20,909 to -2 (describing how public policy is used in consumer
protection cases); see Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)
(2006) ("In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may
consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other
evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for
such determination.").
118. FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 115, at 20,909-3.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
120. FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 115, at 20,908.
121. For an example of a situation where substantial injury from large harms
to a small group of people could occur consider the rationale behind the FTC
Franchise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2010). See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibi-
tions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg.
59,614, 59,621-39 (Dec. 21, 1978) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436) (finding
that franchising practices posed significant threats to franchisees and therefore fell
under scope of FTCA).
122. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 362 (1986), affd sub nom.
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[A]n injury may
be substantial if it does a small harm to a large number of people."); see also Post-
ing of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg.
23,871, 23,872 (Dec. 16, 1971) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 306) (describing
potential harm to consumers from overpaying by a few cents for each gallon of
gasoline).
123. The Supreme Court has approved this practice in relation to the compe-
tition side of the FTCA. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 371 (1965) ("Upon
considering the destructive effect on commerce that would result from the wide-
spread use of [the practice,] we conclude that the Commission was clearly justified
in refusing the participants an opportunity to offset these evils by a showing of
economic benefit to themselves."). This is basically a ban on considering the exter-
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mine if terminating the practice would actually make consumers
worse off, a consideration that includes the costs of implementing
the remedy, as well as the effect of the remedy itself.12 4
The final part of the Commission's consideration, that con-
sumers cannot reasonably avoid the injury on their own,1 25 carries
the most weight. The FTC has explained that "whether some conse-
quence is 'reasonably avoidable' depends, not just on whether peo-
ple know the physical steps to take in order to prevent it, but also
whether they understand the necessity of actually taking those
steps."126 This framework allows the FTC to step in when the mar-
ket fails to eliminate potential injuries because consumers are una-
ble to accurately express their choices. When consumers can
accurately express their choices, the market will self-correct any po-
tential injuries because consumers will simply avoid harmful
practices.
This Note is concerned with two of the most common types of
consumer injuries: incomplete information and confusing informa-
tion.127 The two are related in that they both obstruct the ability of
the consumer to express her preferences accurately. Both drive up
the costs of receiving the information reasonably necessary to make
a purchasing decision to a point where the consumer is effectively
unable to use that information.128
Incomplete information is a relative concept. Total disclosure
of all information would be costly, if not impossible. Thus, in gen-
eral, only basic information thought necessary for informed deci-
sionmaking-namely, the price and function of the good-is
nalities of the harm on any parties other than consumers. This is logical; one
would not want to allow an exploitative practice because the exploiter gains from it
in an equal or greater amount as the exploited loses.
124. FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 115, at 20,909.
125. Id.
126. Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1066 (1984); accord Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co., 849 F.2d at 1365 (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 366)
("Consumers may act to avoid injury before it occurs if they have reason to antici-
pate the impending harm and the means to avoid it, or they may seek to mitigate
the damage afterward if they are aware of potential avenues toward that end.").
127. Averitt & Lande, supra note 6, at 733 ("The most common internal mar-
ket failures fall into five categories: (1) overt coercion; (2) undue influence; (3)
deception; (4) incomplete information; or (5) confusing information."). Averitt &
Lande give brief descriptions of all five categories of harm. See id. at 733-34.
128. See id.; Averitt, supra note 108, at 258-61 (explaining that consumers are
unable to make rational decisions without disclosure of material information, even
though such information is technically discoverable but only at very high costs to
individual).
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required to be disclosed.129 Specific disclosures of non-basic infor-
mation may be required on a case-by-case basis.130 Only the price at
the time of the sale is required to be disclosed because almost every
bit of information regarding the future value of a product could be
monetized, and to require disclosure of such values would essen-
tially require full disclosure of all tangentially related informa-
tion.'3 1 Thus, things such as maintenance costs and scrap value are
typically not required to be disclosed. Following the same logic, the
information on the function of a product required for disclosure is
typically only the primary function of the product, not any secon-
dary functions. 132
A final basic category of required disclosures includes those
necessary to correct misconceptions about the product or service
where the misconceptions are causing consumer injury.133 The
seller would have to know that the misconceptions exist and are
injuring consumers. The Commission has long required these sorts
of disclosures, as seen in various rules and cases, particularly in in-
stances concerning misleading advertising.' 34 These disclosures are
not central to this Note, as it is assumed that consumers are aware
that taxes exist.135
129. See Averitt, supra note 108, at 260-65 (noting that "[t]here are obviously
a great many pieces of information about a product that consumers might
want[,] . .. [y]et the Commission surely would not require such time-consuming
data to be compiled" and discussing basic disclosures of price, function, and infor-
mation needed to correct misconceptions about products).
130. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 436.5 (2010) (describing required disclosures of
wealth of non-basic information about franchising opportunities); 16 C.F.R.
§ 423.3 (2010) (requiring disclosure of instructions for proper care of garments).
131. Averitt, supra note 108, at 262.
132. Id. at 263-64.
133. Id. at 264-65.
134. Id.; see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 424.1 (2010) (requiring disclosure that adver-
tised goods may be limited in availability, if such is the case); Heavenly Creations,
Inc. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 7, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1964) (upholding FTC's cease and desist
decree against petitioner for failing to disclose certain information in advertise-
ments while noting that "if the Commission ... thinks it best to insist upon a form
of advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring
men, though fools, shall not err therein,' it is not for the courts to revise their
judgment").
135. To the extent that consumers are actually unaware that taxes exist, there
is a case that their disclosure should be mandated under this theory of curing
misconceptions.
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Also, information should not be disclosed in a confusing
way.136 Disclosed information would serve little purpose if consum-
ers were unable to understand what the information meant. Con-
fusing information can be seen as a subset of incomplete
information because it is effectively taken out of the picture, or as a
deceptive trade practice, if the confusion misleads consumers.137
Examples of attempts to prevent confusing information are seen in
the FTC's guides concerning environmental marketing claims138
and the use of endorsements and testimonials in advertisements.1 3 9
3. Tax-Exclusive Pricing is an Unfair Trade Practice
Given its welfare implications, tax-exclusive pricing is an unfair
trade practice under the FTCA because it causes consumer inury.
Tax-exclusive pricing is a clear case of incomplete information in
that it impedes consumers' ability to form accurate preferences in a
way that consumers cannot overcome on their own because of their
cognitive biases discussed above.' 40 Part II of this Note showed that
tax-exclusive pricing leads to taxes being hidden and to consumers
not correctly valuing their costs. This undervaluation leads to sub-
stantial aggregate consumer harm, as consumers suffer from every
purchase that has a hidden tax. Because the individual harm on
each purchase is so small, many consumers may not realize that
they are being harmed, thus not realizing the necessity of cor-
recting their actions even if they had the ability to do so. Finally, as
developed in Part III, individual consumers' welfare is being
harmed, and there are no countervailing benefits to tax-exclusive
pricing that would remove it from the realm of consumer injury.
However, in addition to finding consumer injury, the FTC must also
be assured that the potential remedy's costs do not outweigh its
benefits before it takes action.
136. See Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1962) (up-
holding Commission's order to bread company to stop using language likely to
confuse consumers).
137. Averitt & Lande, supra note 6, at 733-34; Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d
106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945) (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73,
75 (2d. Cir. 1910) ("The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the
public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by
appearances and general impressions.")).
138. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7 (2010).
139. Id. § 255 (2010).
140. See Trout, supra note 56, at 412 (noting that "serious doubts" exist con-
cerning "the ability of normal individuals to make decisions that are" as accurate as
"tested institutional decisions" because of cognitive biases).
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B. How Should the FTC Fix It?
1. The Ideal Disclosure Rule
Given that the FTC has the jurisdiction to tackle the injuries
created by tax-exclusive pricing, what action should it take? The
FTC could best address this issue through a disclosure rule.
Mandatory disclosure of hidden taxes would create substantial ben-
efits for individuals by eliminating the potential for consumer un-
dervaluation of hidden taxes while imposing only a minimal cost on
sellers. 141
Disclosure requirements are frequently simple and relatively
cost-efficient means of regulation,14 2 and are often used in regard
to consumer products.1 4 3 Disclosure does not regulate market
forces, but merely disseminates information with the hope that in-
dividuals will use the information to better define their preferences.
Disclosure facilitates efficient markets by removing barriers to infor-
mation, thus reducing the cost of information. In this case, disclo-
sure would prevent undervaluation by removing the costs associated
with calculation. However, disclosure is not without costs. The di-
rect costs of disclosure include the costs to sellers of collecting,
compiling, and distributing information.144 In addition, too much
disclosure could flood consumers, and consumers may not be able
to process complex or confusing disclosures.14 5 As will be seen,
however, there is a simple way to disclose the costs of hidden taxes
with minimal costs to sellers and little danger of flooding or confus-
ing consumers.
When considering the disclosure scheme it should be observed
that the taxes that should be disclosed are those that a consumer
without any special tax exemptions would have to pay. 14 6 While it
would be ideal for each individual to know the total tax-inclusive
price before purchasing, such a system would be impractical.
141. See Stern, supra note 15, at 87 ("Providing disclosure at the outset of a
transaction ameliorates the information-processing deficits elicited by latecoming
disclosure . . . [and] does not appear to [be] burdensome for sellers and their
agents.").
142. Bar-Gill, supra note 94, at 44, 46, 63.
143. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 306.10 (2010) (requiring disclosure of automotive fuel
ratings); 16 C.F.R. § 423.3 (2010) (requiring disclosure of care requirements on
apparel labels).
144. Bar-Gill, supra note 94, at 63.
145. Id. at 64; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1235
(2003).
146. That different goods may not be taxed the same is tax policy that this
Note is not concerned with.
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Therefore, it must be assumed that consumers with special tax ex-
emptions will be sophisticated enough to realize that they have
those exemptions and that they will be able to calculate their actual
burden. While such an assumption would be contrary to the argu-
ment of this Note, it is the safest assumption to make when creating
the rule. It will cause the least amount of harm until the day when
consumers can find their individual total prices before making
purchasing decisions. While the exemptions differ from state to
state, non-profit organizations are one of the main classes of ex-
empt consumers. Non-profits may be more sophisticated than indi-
vidual consumers due to institutional knowledge and protections.
Indirect taxes on goods, such as corporate taxes that are already
worked into price to some degree, will not need to be disclosed.147
One can conceive of four general schemes for the disclosure of
the price and taxes for consumer goods: 1) fully tax-exclusive
prices, 2) tax and price both stated separately but not added to-
gether, 3) tax and price both stated separately and added together,
and 4) fully tax-inclusive prices with no breakdown. To optimize
consumer sovereignty, price and taxes should be both stated sepa-
rately and added together. To arrive at this conclusion, consider
the effects of each scheme.
The first two means of presenting prices-fully tax-exclusive
and separate disclosure of price and tax-are tax-exclusive pricing
schemes and cannot be allowed because they will cause consumer
injury. Although the second scheme would present the cost of
taxes, the cognitive biases discussed in Part II would still lead to
undervaluation of the total cost of goods even with that disclosure.
Since undervaluation of cost is the target of the disclosure require-
ment, it would not make sense to implement such a scheme if it
would not prevent consumer injury.
A fully tax-inclusive scheme is appealing due to its simplicity
but would create its own problems by hiding taxes in another way-
making their existence less salient.148 Consumers would then have
trouble discovering what their tax burden is in comparison to the
price for a product. This would make it difficult for consumers to
147. Fees are analogous to taxes. Some fees are already required to be dis-
closed by the FTC, see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2010) (requiring disclosure of fees
for funeral parlor goods and services), but many are not. This Note does not ad-
dress fees, but one could surmise that the analysis here would easily apply to fee-
exclusive pricing.
148. See Bird, supra note 14, at 66-68 (describing possible effects of keeping
existence of taxes salient by excluding them from posted prices and exposing them
separately at the register).
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challenge taxes and might lead to over-taxation by the govern-
ment.149 Sellers might also inflate prices and blame the total cost
rise on taxes, although this would most likely constitute a deceptive
act and be illegal as such under the FTCA. While a fully tax-inclu-
sive scheme could viably solve the undervaluation problem, it is not
the best option given its costs.
The tax-inclusive pricing scheme with a breakdown of price
and tax represents the best solution for consumers. This tax-inclu-
sive scheme would ensure that the total price of the product would
be presented to the consumer before the purchasing decision is
made while also giving her the opportunity to understand her ac-
tual tax burden, alleviating over-taxation concerns. 50 This solution
may also cause the taxes that have become hidden to become less
regressive by making them more salient if the public takes notice of
them and wishes to make a change.
There are two possible ways to disclose prices and taxes under
this scheme, and sellers should be given the choice between the
two. The first option would be to state the price, the taxes, and the
total cost before the consumer makes the purchase, presumably by
putting all the information on the price tag. Sellers wanting to dis-
tinguish between their prices and taxes would prefer this method.
This type of disclosure could lead to consumer confusion, but any
confusion could easily be avoided by mandating that the total cost
be in a more noticeable font. The second way to disclose under the
scheme is simple, easy, and practically cost-free. It would be to
merely change the posted price to the tax-inclusive price and main-
tain the current tax and price breakdown on receipts. 15 1 Since dis-
closure requirements should impose as small a burden as possible
149. See Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 1002-05 (discussing reduced consumer
response to increases in tolls, which allowed for increases in the tolls, even during
election years, without negative political impact).
150. The concern arising from the disaggregation bias that consumers will
undervalue their total tax burden will still exist, but the cost of providing consum-
ers with constant reminders of what they have spent would far outweigh the bene-
fits under this new system.
151. It is admitted that the current price and tax breakdown on receipts has
not effectively counteracted the behavioral processes that lead to undervaluation
of hidden taxes, and valid concerns exist that failing to change this structure will
still encourage over-taxation because individuals will not be aware of their tax bur-
den. However, by presenting the tax-inclusive price to consumers on the price tag
rather than the tax-exclusive price, consumers will technically become aware of the
cost of the taxes, and can determine the exact cost by looking at their receipts.
Over-taxation will be less of a concern because consumers will realize the total
costs of products before deciding to purchase them, and if they feel that those
costs are too high, they can lobby the government to lower the tax rate.
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on sellers,15 2 implementing a scheme that requires only a change in
posted prices-while also affording the option to present price
breakdowns on the price tag-is ideal. Additionally, as the costs of
implementing this rule would be small and the benefits huge, it
would pass the FTC's cost-benefit analysis.
2. Implementation Challenges
Though a tax-inclusive scheme with a breakdown of price and
tax appears to be the best way to prevent consumer injuries from
tax-exclusive pricing, it will undoubtedly face some challenges to its
implementation. Such regulation might be attacked as overly pater-
nalistic for failing to give consumers the chance to de-bias them-
selves. However, consumers have proven unable to de-bias
themselves, and this disclosure rule would constitute only "weak pa-
ternalism," where regulators provide individuals with the informa-
tion they need to decide what they want.1 53 Also, given the
negligible costs of disclosure to sophisticated consumers who are
relatively unharmed by undervaluation and the substantial benefits
it would bring to the unsophisticated consumers suffering the most
from undervaluation, the regulation would fit the definition of
"asymmetrical paternalism."1 5 4 Asymmetrically paternalistic regula-
tion has been used approvingly in the past, especially in the con-
sumer protection context.15 5
The regulation might also be attacked for its reliance on be-
havioral economics to define the consumer injury. However, the
FTC's goal in all cases is to accurately understand how trade prac-
152. See Bar-Gill, supra note 94, at 63 (noting that if disclosure requirements
impose too large a burden on seller, cost will be passed to consumer).
153. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 249,
258 (2006) (describing de-biasing efforts through law as the "weakest form of weak
paternalism [because] the relevant steering operates directly on bounded rational-
ity and allows people to act as they see fit"); Klick & Mitchell, supra note 59, at 1621
(noting that under "softer forms of paternalism ... the government regulates the
form in which information and options are presented to citizens and restricts the
role of laypersons in the market, legal, and political systems without completely
controlling choices").
154. Camerer et al., supra note 145, at 1212 ("A regulation is asymmetrically
paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing
little or no harm on those who are fully rational."); see Sunstein, supra note 153, at
256.
155. See Camerer et al., supra note 145, at 1212 (describing asymmetrically
paternalistic regulation in consumer protection context and using Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006), as example). Indeed most, if not all, of
the FTC disclosure regulations cited in this Note, e.g., supra notes 97-103, 138-39,
fit the definition of asymmetrically paternalistic regulation.
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tices affect consumers. In this instance, behavioral economics is
used to supplement the rational response to hidden taxes in a way
that gives a more accurate picture of consumers' reactions. Such
analysis is a valuable tool when used methodically and should not
be ignored by the FTC. Behavioral economics provides valuable in-
sight into the way that trade practices will affect consumer decision-
making,'5 6 and the FTC can use behavioral analysis to help
effectively de-bias consumers, which will lead to more robust and
accurate consumer protection.1 5 7 However, behavioral economic
analyses must be carefully used. There are dangers inherent in
crafting regulation from such tools, and the Commission should be
cautious when so doing.15 8 A cautious approach would mean craft-
ing regulations based on behavioral economic analysis only where
the analysis leads to clear conclusions about consumers, as has been
done here regarding the effects of tax-exclusive pricing.
A further problem is that the FTC has been reluctant to en-
gage in substantive unfairness rulemaking, although it has not ex-
pressed a similar reluctance towards disclosure rules.' 5 9 While the
current trend of the FTC's rulemaking has involved disclosure re-
quirements, as advocated here, most of those rules have followed
congressional mandates.o60 Therefore, it may be necessary for Con-
gress to mandate that prices be tax-inclusive before the Commission
will act. Congressional action may be difficult, given the challenges
of the United States political structure.' 6 ' However, given that all
voters are presumably consumers, such a provision could be ex-
pected to have a reasonable prospect of success if it made it to votes
in the Senate and House of Representatives.
156. See, e.g., Congdon et al., supra note 67, at 2 ("Imperfectly rational people
will respond to taxes in a way that is mediated by psychology.").
157. See Trout, supra note 56, at 433-34 (explaining that de-biasing through
government regulation will enhance both autonomy and welfare).
158. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 59, at 1626 (bringing attention to the
potential "moral and cognitive hazards" of paternalistic interventions); Camerer,
supra note 145, at 1253-54 (discussing need for carefully analysis of cognitive bi-
ases in order to determine if a seemingly irrational behavior is actually rational).
159. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 259 (2002) ("The FTC has not issued a substantive
consumer-contract regulation since the 1984 Credit Practices Rule. Recent rules
tend to emphasize disclosures or the avoidance of misrepresentations and to regu-
late abusive conduct, rather than regulating substantive terms.").
160. MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECnION AND THE LAw § 12:14 (2009).
161. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 425-37 (1988) (detailing and responding to commonly
accepted problems attributed to legislative action by public choice theory).
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As a practical matter, the regulation will need to have a pre-
emption clause since taxes on consumer products are mostly state
imposed rather than federally imposed. 162 Serious problems would
result if the tax-inclusive scheme were not uniform. Individuals
would be drawn to tax-exclusive prices and the whole scheme would
be undermined. This would raise consumer protection concerns in
itself as individuals could be misled by the tax-exclusive prices if
they expect that all prices are tax-inclusive. Therefore, the rule
would need a preemption clause to ensure that sellers in all states
would fall under its mandate. Agency preemption actions can be
problematic though, and may present a hurdle to adoption of the
rule.' 6 3
Monitoring sellers also presents a challenge. There could be a
large incentive to cheat the system by not including taxes because
of the advantages just described. However, doing so would certainly
fall under the jurisdiction of the FTCA, and sellers that violate the
rule could be subjected to fines and injunctive relief.164 This could
be a strict liability offense in order to remedy the situations quickly
and cheaply. Individuals would presumably be able to act as watch-
dogs. Price tags and receipts would allow for easy proof of
violations.
Even given the challenges, the FTC should still take action.
FTC Commissioners have noted that one of the strengths of the
Commission is that it is charged with developing innovative regula-
tory solutions to potentially harmful market practices. 165 A rule
mandating disclosure of taxes on consumer goods, as proposed,
would play to that strength and reaffirm the Commission's commit-
ments to innovative thinking and consumer protection.
V.
CONCLUSION
This Note has proposed that the FTC create a rule mandating
tax-inclusive pricing of consumer goods. Such a dramatic shift in
the way prices of consumer goods are presented may appear hope-
162. For an example of a preemption clause in a FTC rule, see 16 C.F.R.
§ 306.4 (2010).
163. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869, 871-81
(2008) (discussing executive preemption and federalism doctrine).
164. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2006).
165. See generally More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC's Many Tools-A Conver-
sation With Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTrrRUST L.J. 773 (2005) (edited version
of the original conversation at the FTC 90th Anniversary Symposium (Sept. 22,
2004)).
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less at first glance, but the experience of the European Community
and other countries provides evidence that it can work. While the
United States is certainly different from its neighbors worldwide, it
should not ignore the examples those neighbors provide. This Note
by no means advocates that the FTC follow other countries' laws
over U.S. laws, but when deciding how to draft regulation, the Com-
mission would be wise to consider the difficulties and successes of
those countries that have mandated tax-inclusive pricing.
This Note has applied the FTC's determination that incom-
plete information can create serious injuries to consumer sover-
eignty-the ability of consumers to freely choose from a variety of
options on the market-to the practice of tax-exclusive pricing.
Tax-exclusive pricing creates incomplete pricing information by
lowering levels of tax salience such that taxes on consumer goods
become hidden from and undervalued by consumers. Undervalua-
tion leads to overconsumption and significant harm to individuals'
welfare. The FTC must step in and provide consumers with the
price information they are unable to discover on their own. Requir-
ing sellers to present tax-inclusive prices is the cheapest and most
efficient way of correcting this problem, and thus the Commission
should mandate this practice.
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APPENDIX
Price
After-tax Supply
Pre-tax Supply
Deadweight Loss
Quant
In this traditional model, the tax is fully salient to the consumer
and its cost is considered in purchasing decisions, creating a dead-
weight loss to society. The deadweight loss from the tax is repre-
sented by area ABC, which is created because consumers who
would be willing to purchase pre-tax are not willing to purchase
after-tax.
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After-tax Supply
Pre-tax Supply
D
After-tax
Equilirm
priceA
Income Loss to Consumers
from Overconsumption
Pre-tax Equilirm
__ 17 Demand
Quantity
In this hidden tax model, consumers ignore the cost of the tax and
continue to purchase at pre-tax levels, causing overconsumption
given the total price. The income loss to consumers from overcon-
sumption is represented by area ABD, which is created because con-
sumers pay more for the pre-tax equilibrium quantities than they
anticipate.
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